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Özlem Onaran 
 
1.  Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the fragility of the New Member 
States and accession countries in the Central Eastern and South Eastern 
European countries (henceforth Eastern Europe) to the turbulences in the 
global economy and the changes in the direction of the international 
capital flows. The economies of Eastern Europe have been experiencing 
high growth rates since mid or late 1990s after the initial transition crisis. 
The international financial flows, particularly FDI, have played an 
important role in this period. Nevertheless this process has also resulted 
in an increase in the current account deficits of quite many countries like 
Hungary, the Baltic States, Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia. The paper 
assesses the sustainability of these conditions and compares the current 
state of fragility with former crises in Asia and Latin America. Turkey, 
being a candidate country as well as a country, which has already 
experienced the bitter taste of financial crisis twice since 1994, will also 
be analysed providing an interesting basis of comparison. The paper aims 
at discussing the fragility in the emerging markets in the Eastern Europe 
and the possible evolution of the risk perceptions of both the creditors as 
well as the debtors in this “speculation game” based on the post-
Keynesian/Minskyan concepts of endogenous expectations and financial 
fragility.  
Although everyone would agree that the current account deficit can not 
increase forever, mainstream economists as well as international 
investors are hoping that increased investment, which could increase 
productivity, will guarantee a smooth adjustment of the exchange rate 
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and the deficit. An important part of this optimism is due to the positive 
expectations about foreign direct investment (FDI) and the EU-anchor.  
This paper questions this optimism: First EU-wide integration is not a 
project that aims at overcoming the structural bottlenecks of the Eastern 
European economies. The domination of neoliberal policies reduces the 
project of integration to the expansion of markets, and to securing the 
mobility of capital under stable conditions. Second can an economy, 
which is ruled by the rationale of profit seeking private capital flows, be 
stable, or is it the logic of those activities that will create a crisis sooner 
or later within the normal and even successful functioning of the system? 
The second part of the title of this paper is inspired by a similar question, 
which was asked by Minsky (1982) in the context of US, where he 
discusses the possibility of recurrence of depression. The Minskyan, and 
more generally the post-Keynesian theory suggest that financial markets 
are prone to speculation and intrinsically unstable. Stable growth phases 
will cause more risky investment practices, shaky financial structures, 
and thus boom periods will be followed by a bust. In that respect EU also 
does not make a difference, and even the more advanced economies 
themselves are not immune to crisis. This paper attempts to show that the 
fact that the Eastern European Countries did manage to live with their 
current account deficits until today, does not mean that they can do so in 
the future without facing a major crisis. 
The giant global imbalances led by the huge US current account deficit, 
the possibility of a sharp slow-down in the US growth and major global 
turbulences in the financial markets add further dimensions to our 
question today. These may affect the emerging economies through the 
contraction in export-markets, the decrease in the risk appetite and 
increase in the risk perceptions of international investors, the increase in 
the interest rates, and the decline in the private capital flows towards 
relatively riskier emerging markets. Emerging economies with high 
current account deficits, high ratios of short-term external debt, large 
share of foreign denominated or foreign currency-indexed debt, weak 
domestic banking systems would have particular disadvantages 
(Goldstein, 2005). Turkey, the Baltic countries, Bulgaria, Romania, and 
to some extent Hungary and Slovakia unfortunately have either all or 
parts of these vulnerabilities. Already in 2006 May-June Hungary and 
Turkey took their share of the global turbulences, and in August 2007 
their stability is once again being tested by the financial panic in the 
global markets following the crisis of the hedge-funds and risky financial 
instruments.  At the time of writing this article, it has been a month since 
the break of the hedge fund crisis. How the expectations of the markets 
evolve after the initial panic is a different issue and beyond the scope of 
  
this paper. The important question for us is not “when will a crisis 
happen?”, rather “can it happen here as well?” and the answer of this 
article is “yes, it can happen here”. It suffices to say that the Wall Street 
Journal (Lahart, 2007) during the peak days of the rediscovery of the 
fragility in the global markets, wrote that Minsky’s views have become 
suddenly very popular, because his work indeed predicts the systemic 
crisis.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two defines the 
generation of cycles of the boom and bust from a post-Keynesian 
perspective. Section three discusses the leading indicators of fragility in 
Eastern Europe. Section four presents the effects of global turbulences up 
till now.  Section five derives the conclusions. 
2.  Financial fragility and boom-bust cycles 
The post-Keynesian perspective of boom-bust cycles is based on the 
insights developed by Keynes (1936) and then later by Minsky (1982, 
1986) on the systemic financial fragility and instability hypothesis. This 
is an analysis of the linkages between financial and real variables. 
Systemic financial fragility develops endogenously out of the normal 
functioning of the economy. If good performance persists, investors 
become more optimistic and are willing to hold more risky assets or 
accept higher levels of debt. They engage in speculative financing 
patterns based on short-term financing of investment projects with long 
time horizons. In order to be able to speculate, investors invent new 
forms of credit and ‘kinds of money’ (e.g. junk bonds, growth of 
derivatives, swaps …). Thus it is hard to prevent speculation, because the 
means of financing speculation will change, and money is endogenously 
generated. This makes the firms vulnerable to credit availability and 
interest rate shocks, which leads to financial instability. A speculative 
growth pattern emerges in this process, where the payments of a firm 
may be larger than its expected income, and the difference can only be 
met by rolling over debt. In time, when there is a negative shock, and 
expectations evolve in a pessimistic direction, this fragility leads to a 
crisis through credit crunch, debt crisis, and bankruptcies. Skott (1995) 
develops a formal model of Minskyan cycle of boom and bust based on 
the endogenous development of “fragility and tranquillity.” 
Endogenously evolving expectations play an important role in the 
formation of the financial fragility and the boom-bust cycles. 
Expectations are formed under fundamental uncertainty about the 
return/risk profiles of investment. Therefore, rational agents are 
influenced by conventional wisdom. Keynes himself argued that 
speculation on the stock markets is like betting on a beauty contest: You 
  
try to predict what the majority of people will think. Everyone is trying to 
guess what everyone else will guess. Thus it’s about investor sentiment, 
not fundamentals. Conventional wisdom is not only expectations induced 
but also competition coerced (Crotty 1993). Competitive pressures 
among firms or fund managers push them to take similar risks, even 
when they would rather be more conservative.  
A speculative frenzy leads to evolving boom-euphoric expectations, 
increasing the risk appetite of the investors. Thus conventional wisdom is 
not static. Evaluations about what is reasonable change. Expectations are 
mutually validated by the actions of market participants, which lead to a 
self propelling adventurism and financial fragility during good times. As 
expectations of profits are realized over time, they become more 
optimistic and more self-confident in reducing safety margins.  
The fragility of the system is an outcome of the “success” of the system. 
Sooner or later when there is a shock to the system, the built in financial 
fragility leads ultimately to a crisis, and lower rates of real sector growth. 
But the length and depth of both the boom and bust phases are variant, 
and not deterministic. It depends on not only the size of the vulnerability 
and the shock, but also on the evolution of expectations.   
After crash and crisis, the investors will be cautious again for a while, but 
eventually after long enough a time has passed, competitive pressures 
and new search for profitable investment will start a new endogenous 
cycle of stability, to be followed by instability. The ultimate conclusion 
of the financial fragility hypothesis is that capitalist market economies 
cannot lead to stable full employment equilibrium.    
Capital account opening adds exchange rate risks to the financial fragility 
generated by domestic financial liberalization1. International financial 
liberalization and capital inflows generate a fragile, foreign debt-
dependent, speculative growth pattern. In addition to cash flow and 
maturity imbalances of the closed economy, another factor that adds to 
fragility is exchange rate mismatches in the cash inflows and outflows of 
the indebted countries. As capital inflows generate growth in a country, 
boom euphoric expectations, conventional wisdom, and competitive 
international pressures lead to further capital inflows, which in turn cause 
the appreciation of the local currency and foreign trade deficit. As 
currency appreciation increases and current account deficits and foreign 
debt problems pile up, a shock in the neighbour country, in the world 
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economy or in the domestic political or economic system sparks a shift in 
the conventional wisdom towards pessimism and leads to the reversal of 
capital flows. In the end an expected depreciation becomes a self-
fulfilling prophecy. The resulting debt problem becomes magnified by 
economic recession and depreciation. 
3. “Can it happen” here? 
In this section we compare the values of some commonly accepted, 
major leading indicators of fragility and crisis2 for the Eastern Europe as 
of 2006 and 2007 (first quarter) with the values of the same indicators in 
ten Asian and Latin American countries before their crisis year (Turkey 
in 1993 and 2000, Mexico in 1994, Indonesia, Thailand, and Korea in 
1996, Malaysia and the Philippines in 1997, Brazil in 1998, Argentina in 
2000). The indicators that are discussed below are current account deficit 
as a ratio to GDP as well as international foreign exchange reserves, short 
term foreign debt as a ratio to total debt and international foreign 
exchange reserves, and appreciation rate of domestic currency. The 
comparison shows at times how close some Eastern European countries 
are to the ‘red zone’, but they also show that agents’ evaluation of risks 
do not follow a pre-determined rule of thumb. 
Figure 1 shows the current account deficit as a ratio to GDP in the 
Eastern European Countries. The values of the current account 
deficit/GDP ratio before the crisis in ten other cases of crisis in Asian and 
Latin American countries are also shown in the graph on the left hand 
side. With their current account deficits the Eastern European countries 
are the exceptions among the emerging economies, along with South 
Africa3. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, and Romania have record 
high deficit ratios. Although all of these ratios are beyond what can be 
perceived as sustainable, the case of Latvia is a record among the records 
with a ratio of 19.5%. The hard peg in these countries (except for 
Romania) resulted in high current account deficits (Becker, 2007). 
Croatia is also among the rather high deficit countries. Hungary had until 
2007 a high deficit (6.9% in 2005 and 5.8% in 2006), which is estimated 
to come down to 4.6% in 20074. Although the decline is certainly 
                                                 
2 See Goldstein (2005) and Goldstein et al. (2000).  
3 South Africa is expected to have a current account deficit/GDP ratio of  
6.2% in 2007 (www.economist.com/indicators). Mexico and India ar 
expected to have minor deficits (1.0% and 1.4% respectively).    
4 Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, henceforth WIIW, 
2007. The estimation of the Economist (www.economist.com/indicators) 
is  5.2%. 
  
perceived as a good signal for the markets, the ratio is nevertheless still 
high. Slovakia had also suffered from increasing current account deficit 
up to 8.3% in 2006, and a fall down to 4.7% is estimated (WIIW, 2007). 
Nevertheless these are still high numbers, compared to many of the 
previous pre-crisis levels. A rise is expected in the Czech Republic 
towards a level of 4.3% (WIIW, 2007). Finally Turkey has been 
experiencing high deficits since 2004, and in spite of a minor 
improvement the ratio is not expected to fall below 6%5. Indeed this 
deficit ratio is much higher than the same ratios in Turkey before the 
crises of both 1994 (3.6% in 1993) and 2001 (4.9% in 2000).  
While the ratio of the current account deficit to GDP compares the deficit 
with the size of the economy, the ratio of the current account deficit to 
foreign exchange reserves of the Central Bank (see Figure 2) gives an 
idea about the ability of the country to finance capital outflow in case of 
a reversal in the direction of the international flows. According to this 
ratio the picture looks a little better, but not fundamentally different for 
the Baltic countries, Bulgaria, and Romania. Estonia and Latvia have the 
highest rates, going beyond any historical record.   
In terms of the foreign debt related risk indicators, the turn-over risk, i.e. 
the ratio of short term foreign debt in total foreign debt, which can be 
seen in Figure 3, is highest in Slovakia followed by Latvia and the other 
Baltic States, Bulgaria, Romania. Even the Czech Republic is playing in 
this risky league according to the turn-over risk. All these ratios are well 
above the nine former cases of crises and close to the highest ratio that 
Thailand had experienced before the crisis. The prospects are not much 
better in the case of the ratio of short-term foreign debt to foreign 
exchange reserves6 (see Figure 4); the ratio is rather high in the Baltic 
States and Slovakia. Bulgaria comes next, approaching the ‘red zone’ of 
100% (89.5%). Moreover it is also important, which agents in the 
economy are indebted. In these highly euroized economies of the East, 
private firms and households are expected to receive significant negative 
shocks in case of a sharp depreciation (see Becker, 2007) with important 
spill-over effects to demand and production.   
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(www.economist.com/indicators) 6.2%. 
6 This indicates the hardship of the country to finance its short-term debt 
with its reserves. 
  
Figure 5 shows the developments in the real appreciation of the exchange 
rate (trade weighted effective) as of 2007 July compared to 20047. An 
overvalued currency increases the expectations for a correction, since the 
sustainability of the current account deficit becomes more and more 
suspicious. Goldstein et al. (2000) argue that real exchange rate 
overvaluation is one of the best performing leading indicators of a crisis. 
The appreciation in the real exchange rate is alarming in Romania 
(33.8%), and Slovakia is also approaching to the alarm zone with 17.3%. 
Turkey, in spite of the strong depreciation during 2006 May-June 
turbulences, has experienced a strong appreciation once again due to 
capital inflows in 2007. In the other countries appreciation rates during 
2007 July-2004 December ranged between 10% in Latvia, 9% in 
Bulgaria, and 6-7% in Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and the Czech 
Republic.    However, in terms of the cumulative appreciation rates 
during 1995-2007, all countries other than Poland have experienced a 
major appreciation already.   
The relevant question is whether these indicators are above the critical 
values that would be an invitation to crisis. In 2001 Dornbusch (2001, 
cited in Uygur 2001) had argued that the red region of crisis begins with 
25% real appreciation and 4% current account deficit/GDP ratio. 
However we know that the critical rates can differ significantly 
depending on the conditions: for example 4.4% of real appreciation had 
been enough in the Korean case under the contagion effect.  
In the case of Eastern Europe conventional wisdom in the market about 
what is risky seems to have changed. One important basis for the re-
evaluation of the rule of thumbs is due to the contribution of imputed 
foreign profits to the current account deficit. As the foreign investors 
make profits, this is imputed as debit in the current account of the Eastern 
European countries. Therefore Brada and Tomsik (2003) argue that the 
old rule of thumb of 5% current account deficit as a ratio to GDP being 
risky is not valid in this case. Although the argument makes sense, and 
markets indeed have apparently valued that fact, the question is then how 
high a current account deficit will be alarming? Regarding the 
appreciation of the currency a similar optimism about redefining more 
tolerant critical values also apply. Here the argument is that in emerging 
markets, in particular the transition economies the appreciation of the 
currency is a natural catching up phenomenon (Balassa-Samuelson 
effect). However, would the markets care much if a couple of unlucky 
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included in this figure. 
  
events (like the global financial troubles) and a few of the not so 
favourable ratios coincide at a certain point in time?   
Another important reason about the tolerance of the markets is the FDI 
optimism, which is forming an important part of capital inflows in these 
countries (Mencinger, 2007), and thereby financing the current account 
though the so-called safe means. In the case of Turkey this is also a point 
in which the FDI optimists expect that EU could make a positive impact 
on the dependency of Turkey on short-term capital flows until recently. 
Turkey has been attracting significant amount of FDI inflows particularly 
since 2006. The EU anchor, which guarantees the stability of the political 
regime, property rights, and the markets, is expected to keep FDI going. 
However, FDI inflow can also be interrupted when the country faces a 
severe crisis, or firms can even relocate. Moreover, other long-term 
problems in the absence of a systematic industrial policy remain to be 
valid, such as increased import dependency, which may generate further 
current account deficits. Mencinger (2003) reports that multinational 
enterprises contributed more to imports than to exports, and the spill-
overs from single firms to the sector does not seem to be relevant, which 
leads to a dual economy with significant productivity differentials. 
Another issue regarding the effects of FDI is the repatriated profits. After 
a certain phase, foreign investors start harvesting the fruits of their 
investments and transfer their profits back home, which may make the 
financing of the current account more problematic. The opportunities of 
the multinationals to invest in developing countries with even cheaper 
labor may further deter reinvesting profits in the initial affiliate 
(Mencinger, 2007).   
In addition to FDI optimism, till now an important mechanism behind the 
changing perceptions of risk is the EU anchor8. EU is a guarantee that the 
country will stick to liberal policies, fiscal discipline, and will avoid 
capital controls, which all secure the mobility of capital flight as well as 
the funds to finance debt payments. But ironically this anchor based on 
the integration to the EU economic zone creates another source of 
fragility. First more optimism and capital inflow leads to risky debt 
behaviour as well as the appreciation of the currency. Second these 
countries try to avoid depreciation because of preparing for the entry to 
the monetary union. But given the productivity and inflation differentials, 
this process invites real appreciation. Until now the Baltic countries had 
                                                 
8 In the case of Turkey the anchor is the accession process and FDI 
inflows, although membership is a far future prospect full of 
uncertainties. 
  
seen the Euro as an exit strategy (Becker, 2007), but since their entry to 
the Monetary union is delayed, they may face the market pressures to 
oblige a more bitter exit like Argentina had to do. However even if they 
achieve what they were hoping for, i.e. adopt the Euro without a major 
accident on the way, this time they will nevertheless experience the 
adverse effects of being an insider with huge productivity differentials 
with respect to the core countries. This has been the story of other 
peripheral countries like Spain, Greece, Portugal, and even Italy.   
The Economist (2007a:29) resembles the situation of the ten East 
European member states of the EU to inexperienced drivers on a “smooth 
road in fine weather” and warns: “if the road gets slippery, bad brakes 
and bald tyres make a crash, even a pile-up horribly likely.” Latvia’s 
situation attracts particular attention. If Latvia has to abandon the hard 
peg the likeliest route for contagion will be Estonia, says the Economist 
(2007a:29) and adds to its list:  “The other early candidate for a crash has 
long been Hungary.” Naturally Turkey has always been a part of this list 
of fragile countries (Onaran, 2007). 
To sum up until very recently the investors` risk appetite had seemed not 
to be disturbed only marginally by these ratios. But the question is for 
how long? The answer depends on recent history, and how recently and 
how badly investors were punished by volatility in the returns, and how 
long the recent boom has been continuing (Grabel 1995). A dealer cannot 
afford to be conservative for a long time, since no one can be sure when 
the accumulated fragility will lead to a crisis. He/she has to follow the 
conventional wisdom and try to invest the funds as profitable as the other 
dealers, if he/she wants to keep his/her job. However shocks that are not 
necessarily intrinsic to these economies may play an unpleasant role. 
Thus the developments depend a lot on how the issue of the US current 
account deficit and the fragilities regarding the hedge funds will be 
solved. Below we will discuss this issue in more detail. 
4. Global Turbulences 
In the global financial markets all these problems were seen much less 
relevant until May-June 2006, when the optimism in the East and 
elsewhere in the emerging markets was affected by the global 
turbulences in the world economy. This was a response to the rise in the 
interest rates in the US, and resulted in a massive flee of international 
investors out of the emerging markets. At the time the flight of 
international financial investors out of the emerging markets was 
explained mostly by the fear that rising interest rates and the slowdown 
in the US economy might ultimately upset the delicate harmony of the 
  
global economy9. Turkey, Hungary along with Brazil and South Africa 
were among the emerging markets, which were hit most severely. Poland 
and Slovakia were also affected slightly.  
The May-June 2006 turbulences were short-lived and the investors soon 
started to enjoy the low asset prices even in the riskiest markets like 
Turkey after the initial panic. Aggressive risky investment behaviour 
looked for reasons to explain why the mechanism will not break down; 
the coercive competitive pressures led the conventional wisdom to shift 
again towards buoyancy (Onaran, 2007). Indeed it was defined as “a bit 
of profit-taking” and “a drama not a crisis” by The Economist (2006: 74). 
A kind of a consensus emerged that there is only real reason to worry if 
one believes that the world is going into a global recession and at that 
time this was a possibility that the market professionals have to rule out 
in order not to shift to overly conservative investment practices too early 
in time. Because that would then make them deliver lower profits to their 
customers compared to their competitor dealers, who have a higher risk 
appetite (Onaran, 2007).  
However, soon other dark sides of the global financial markets emerged. 
In the past years “the absence of severe recessions or abrupt shifts in 
monetary policy had made investors more confident, and thus more 
willing to borrow” says the Economist (The Economist, 2007b: 59), 
almost reminding us of Minsky. This process brought together the 
invention of new risky financial instruments. Banks could bundle 
together risky assets with changing degrees of risk levels. That sounded 
good in theory. In the meantime hedge funds have relied on cheap credit 
to fund their risky investment across the globe as well as the huge 
takeovers and leveraged buyouts. Then in 2007 February the bad news 
from the US, in particular the subprime mortgage markets (loans to 
people without income and job assets) shook the markets for assets 
backed by these loans, but then the markets stopped worrying again 
(Dillow, 2007). On July 10 the chief executive of Citigroup had said: 
“when the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. 
But as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance” (in 
Elliott, 2007). Two weeks later the music stopped –apparently sooner 
than what Citigroup expected. As the defaults in the subprime markets 
(loans to people without income and job assets) have been much higher 
than expected, and as the riskiest mortgage backed securities’ prices have 
fallen, some hedge funds experienced serious problems of liquidity. 
Indeed the market for such securities had become suddenly very illiquid 
                                                 
9 See Onaran (2007) for a review of the business press at the time. 
  
(The Economist, 2007b: 59). The markets started to realize that the 
global economy is in a credit crunch territory, where banks either reduce 
the amount they are willing to lend or make that lending so expensive 
that it deters borrowing (Elliott, 2007). But this will be big problem for 
some hedge funds. Furthermore banks themselves have vulnerabilities 
(The Economist, 2007c: 60): “Wall Streets five big investment banks 
have piled potentially illiquid risky assets…. Several European Banks 
and insurers are rumoured to be sitting on mortgage bombs-troubled 
assets linked to America’s subprime mess”. The Banks’ link to the hedge 
funds within their own group to which they may also have to supply 
rescue capital is a second source of vulnerability. As the risks of a credit 
crunch grew, the Central Banks have injected massive amounts of 
liquidity to the markets after July 26, but this did not calm down the 
financial investors; instead they thought “the ECB is bailing out banks –
things must have been even worse than we knew” (Dillow, 2007).  
The further implications for Eastern Europe are yet to be seen as the 
global markets go through shrinkage in liquidity. The result also depends 
on whether this process will be just a healthy “credit squeeze” (The 
Economist, 2007d: 9) or lead to a deeper crisis. Peripheral countries seem 
not to be affected more than the centre in the first month.  Nevertheless 
there has been some turbulence in the financial markets in the Eastern 
Europe again: In the four weeks between July 25-August 22 the Turkish 
Lira depreciated by 6%, and the stock market index fell by 14.5%. The 
situation in Hungary was similar: a 5.7% depreciation of the Forint, and a 
10.3% decline in the stock market. The Polish Zloty was not affected 
much, but the stock market fell by 9.7%. The Romanian and the Baltic 
Stock Market Indices also fell by 6.8% and 6.7% respectively. Overall 
the emerging markets share prices index fell 11.5%. As there are no safer 
heavens to go now, some Eastern European countries may remain stable. 
However some others like Turkey or the Baltic States may not be that 
lucky. 
5. Conclusion 
If the conventional wisdom of the markets shifts from optimism to 
pessimism, can the EU-anchor help Eastern Europe? Simply ignoring the 
possibility of a massive capital outflow, which will trigger deeper real 
effects in the future, seems to be gambling in policy making. This 
behaviour is like ignoring a gas leakage in your house, and choosing a 
“wait and see” strategy, rather than trying to fix the leakage (Onaran, 
2007). 
Sound policy requires taking the global turbulences and their 
consequences seriously and considering them as cases in defence of 
  
financial regulation and international capital controls. Financial 
regulation along with industrial policy is the only long-run policy 
alternative to prevent financial fragility and the potential causes of a 
future crisis.  
So the question is what makes this so obvious fact be ignored by the 
domestic policy makers and international organizations. The obvious 
measures like capital controls are not in the interest of the national and 
international capital that they are representing. Investors have to follow 
the short-term profit seeking motive and find innovative ways of making 
more profits without borders, even if they are risky.   
The policy lesson of this analysis is that markets can not prevent 
systemic risk, but only postpone it and make it bigger. There is need for a 
democratic, but yet regulatory intervention to make the economy meet 
the needs of the people. Only then we can talk of a European 
enlargement project that can make a difference.  
  
Figure 1: Current Account Deficit in relation to GDP (in %), 2007* for 
Europe and crisis years of others 
Current Account Deficit/GDP (%) 
2007* for Europe & Crisis years for others
Tur
Cz Hun
Pol
Sk
Sl
Est
Lat
Lit
Bul
Rom
Croa
Tur, P
Tur93, A, I K, Br
Me
 
 
Ma 
Th
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
 
 
 
I: Indonesia 96, K: Korea 96, M: Malaysia 97; P: Philippines 97; Th: Thailand 96; A: 
Argentina 00, B: Brazil 98; Me: Mexico 94; Tur93 and Tur00: Turkey 93 & 00 
Tur: Turkey; Cz: Czech Republic; Hun: Hungary; Pol: Poland; Sk: Slovakia; Sl: 
Slovenia; Est: Estonia; Lat: Latvia; Lit: Lithuania; Bul: Bulgaria; Rom: Romania  
Source: WIIW estimations for Europe and for the other countries own calculations 
based on Economic Intelligence Unit Online Database (EIU).  
  
Figure 2: Current Account Deficit in relation to FX Reserves (in %), 
2007-March for Europe and crisis years of others 
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Mexico 94 not in graph: -472,5 
I: Indonesia 96, K: Korea 96, M: Malaysia 97, P: Philippines 97, Th: Thailand 96, A: 
Argentina 00, B: Brazil 98, M: Mexico 94, Tur93 & Tur 00: Turkey 93 and 00.  
Tur: Turkey; Cz: Czech Republic; Hun: Hungary; Pol: Poland; Sk: Slovakia; Sl: 
Slovenia; Est: Estonia; Lat: Latvia; Lit: Lithuania; Bul: Bulgaria; Rom: Romania.  
Source: Own calculations based on Economic Intelligence Unit Online Database (EIU). 
  
Figure 3: Short-term Foreign Debt in relation to total Foreign Debt Stock (in %), 2006 
for Europe and crisis years for others  
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Slovenia; Est: Estonia; Lat: Latvia; Lit: Lithuania; Bul: Bulgaria; Rom: Romania 
Source: Own calculations based on Economic Intelligence Unit Online Database (EIU) 
  
Figure 4: Short-term Foreign debt Stock in relation to FX Reserves (%), 
2006 for Europe and crisis years for others  
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Mexico 94 not in graph: 626% 
I: Indonesia 96, K: Korea 96, M: Malaysia 97, P: Philippines 97, Th: Thailand 96, A: 
Argentina 00, B: Brazil 98, M: Mexico 94, Tur93 & Tur 00: Turkey 93 and 00.  
Tur: Turkey; Cz: Czech Republic; Hun: Hungary; Pol: Poland; Sk: Slovakia; Sl: 
Slovenia; Est: Estonia; Lat: Latvia; Lit: Lithuania; Bul: Bulgaria; Rom: Romania 
Source: Own calculations based on Economic Intelligence Unit Online Database(EIU).  
  
Figure 5: Appreciation of the real exchange rate (trade-weighted basket, 
in %), 2007 July-2004 December for Europe and 24 month before crisis 
for others  
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I: Indonesia 96, K: Korea 96, M: Malaysia 97, P: Philippines 97, Th: Thailand 96, A: 
Argentina 00, B: Brazil 98, M: Mexico 94, Tur93 & Tur 00: Turkey 93 and 00.  
Tur: Turkey; Cz: Czech Republic; Hun: Hungary; Pol: Poland; Sk: Slovakia; Sl: 
Slovenia; Est: Estonia; Lat: Latvia; Lit: Lithuania; Bul: Bulgaria; Rom: Romania 
Source: Own calculations based on European Central Bank 
(http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?currentNodeId=2018795) for the EU Member 
States, the Central Bank of Turkey (http://evds.tcmb.gov.tr/) for turkey, and the 
Economist Intelligence Unit Database for Croatia. For the former crisis: Uygur (2001), 
Esquivel/Larrain (1999).  
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